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Policy Challenges of Open, Cumulative, and User 
Innovation 
Joel West  
INTRODUCTION 
The work of Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. (1918–2007), chronicles the 
development of the leading industrial firms such as General Motors 
and DuPont.
1
 In Chandler‘s telling, such modern United States 
industrial firms emerged in the first half of the 20th century through 
an integrated value chain linking research and development 
(―R&D‖), manufacturing, and distribution.2 
In his 2003 book, Open Innovation: The New Imperative for 
Creating and Profiting from Technology, Henry Chesbrough argued 
that the Chandlerian paradigm of vertical integration had become 
obsolete in both theory and practice.
3
 Studying companies such as 
IBM and Proctor & Gamble, he described an emerging ―open 
innovation paradigm,‖ in which firms work beyond their boundaries 
to obtain and commercialize innovation, a paradigm that heavily has 
 
  Professor, College of Business, San José State University. This Article is based on 
earlier presentations at the 2007 European Academy of Management, and the Washington 
University in St. Louis Conference on Open Source and Proprietary Models of Innovation: 
Beyond Ideology (Apr. 4–5, 2008). I am grateful to Charles McManis for the invitation to 
present the keynote at the workshop and to participate in this special issue. 
 1. See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION 
IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977); ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., SCALE AND SCOPE: THE 
DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM (1990). 
 2. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND, supra note 1; CHANDLER, SCALE AND SCOPE, supra 
note 1. 
 3. See HENRY CHESBROUGH, OPEN INNOVATION: THE NEW IMPERATIVE FOR CREATING 
AND PROFITING FROM TECHNOLOGY (2003); see also OPEN INNOVATION: RESEARCHING A NEW 
PARADIGM (Henry Chesbrough et al. eds., 2006); Oliver Gassmann, Editorial, Opening Up the 
Innovation Process: Towards an Agenda, 36 R&D MGMT. 223, 223–26 (2006) (introducing a 
special issue on open innovation). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 30:17 
 
 
influenced recent research in innovation.
4
 Chesbrough, however, is 
neither the first nor the only scholar to suggest that the actual (or 
best) practice of innovation goes beyond the boundaries of the firm. 
Two other broad streams of innovation research explicitly span 
organizational boundaries. One is the user innovation paradigm 
developed by Eric von Hippel, which focuses on the role of informed 
users in improving and extending products.
5
 The other stream in 
economics and sociology considers the cumulative innovation efforts 
across various, often competing, firms, exemplified by the work of 
Suzanne Scotchmer.
6
 
Although these three critiques share an interorganizational 
perspective, they focus on different sources of innovation outside the 
firm.
7
 In this Article, I contrast the implications of these three 
theories of interorganizational innovation
8
 for the Chandlerian model 
of industrial innovation. I then analyze the potential impact of various 
public policies upon such interorganizational innovation and suggest 
opportunities for research in this area. 
I. CONTRASTING MODELS OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION 
There are three major perspectives on interorganizational 
innovation: user-contributed innovation, collective and cumulative 
innovation, and open innovation. 
 
 4. See generally CHESBROUGH, supra note 3. 
 5. See ERIC VON HIPPEL, THE SOURCES OF INNOVATION 25–26 (1988). 
 6. SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES (2004) (providing the first 
complete explanation of the theoretical and practical imperatives behind policies promoting 
cumulative innovation). Other key works include Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, 
Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?, in INNOVATION POLICY AND THE 
ECONOMY 51, 65–69 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2002); Fiona Murray & Siobhán O‘Mahony, 
Exploring the Foundations of Cumulative Innovation: Implications for Organization Science, 
18 ORG. SCI. 1006 (2007). 
 7. See Table 1, infra. 
 8. When individual users are providing innovations to an organization, the modifier 
―extra-organizational‖ might be more accurate than ―interorganizational.‖ For simplicity‘s sake, 
the term ―interorganizational innovation‖ is used herein to subsume all manifestations and 
extensions of the user, cumulative, and open innovation frameworks. 
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A. Von Hippel: User Innovation 
In his original study, The Sources of Innovation, von Hippel 
argues that many firms have successfully found ideas for 
commercially important innovations outside the firm.
9
 Although the 
book mentions suppliers as a possible source of innovation, von 
Hippel‘s ideas focus primarily on buyer innovation, particularly at the 
individual level.
10
 For example, in his 2005 book Democratizing 
Innovation, von Hippel‘s stated goal is to document that ―users of 
products and services—both firms and individual consumers—are 
increasingly able to innovate for themselves.‖11 
The user innovation paradigm is most broadly applied in the study 
of open source software, which arose in the 1980s as an alternate 
means of producing an information good.
12
 Open source software 
typically is developed by a loosely organized federation of individual 
users. The Apache open source web server is an example of one of 
the most successful and studied open source projects. Based on the 
university-developed NCSA server, Apache was developed by a 
group of webmasters beginning in 1995 to solve their own needs.
13
 
The Apache case illustrates that the user innovation paradigm is 
consistent with both the practice and the motivations of individual 
open source programmers, which have been captured by Raymond‘s 
oft-quoted aphorism that ―[e]very good work of software starts by 
scratching a developer‘s personal itch.‖14 
Research on user innovation in open source examines the benefits 
and origins of user-contributed innovations, as well as the various 
approaches to facilitating user innovation through technical design 
 
 9. VON HIPPEL, supra note 5. 
 10. Id. 
 11. ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION 1 (2005). 
 12. A discussion of the origins of open source software can be found in OPEN SOURCES: 
VOICES FROM THE OPEN SOURCE REVOLUTION (Chris DiBona et al. eds., 1999), and JOSEPH 
FELLER & BRIAN FITZGERALD, UNDERSTANDING OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT 
(2002). A taxonomy of the multiple dimensions of open source production is given by Joel 
West & Siobhán O‘Mahony, The Role of Participation Architecture in Growing Sponsored 
Open Source Communities, 15 INDUSTRY & INNOVATION 145 (2008). 
 13. Brian Behlendorf, Open Source as a Business Strategy, in OPEN SOURCES: VOICES 
FROM A REVOLUTION 149 (Chris DiBona et al. eds., 1999). 
 14. ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR: MUSINGS ON LINUX AND 
OPEN SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL REVOLUTIONARY 23 (rev. ed. 2001). 
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choices.
15
 Other researchers have extended the study of user 
innovation beyond software to sporting goods
16
 and music software.
17
 
Nearly all of the user innovation literature focuses on the actions 
of autonomous individuals acting out of their own motivations. But 
von Hippel‘s original studies of user innovation involved business 
users modifying products for work-related use, such as engineers 
improving electronic instruments.
18
 The theory rarely has been 
applied to corporate motivations for contributing innovations, which 
would be more consonant with the open innovation approach. Open 
innovation may be more appropriate for explaining the self-interested 
role of corporations in creating open source software; this is 
particularly true for firms that create such software not for their own 
use, but rather to support the sale of other goods and services.
19
 
B. Scotchmer: Cumulative Innovation 
A second stream of interorganizational innovation derives from 
the observation that technological progress is built upon a sequence 
of technical advances, both large and small. 
Although the innovation literature, patent system, and fame and 
fortune often reward breakthrough innovation, most technologies are 
refined through a constant stream of incremental improvements. Even 
if a new technology starts as the product of one firm, it usually 
 
 15. See generally Karim R. Lakhani & Eric von Hippel, How Open Source Software 
Works: “Free” User-to-User Assistance, 32 RES. POL‘Y 923 (2003); Georg von Krogh, 
Sebastian Spaeth & Karim R. Lakhani, Community, Joining, and Specialization in Open Source 
Software Innovation: A Case Study, 32 RES. POL‘Y 1217 (2003). For a discussion of user 
innovation toolkits, see Nikolaus Franke & Eric von Hippel, Satisfying Heterogeneous User 
Needs via Innovation Toolkits: The Case of Apache Security Software, 32 RES. POL‘Y 1199 
(2003).  
 16. See, e.g., Nikolaus Franke & Sonali Shah, How Communities Support Innovative 
Activities: An Exploration of Assistance and Sharing Among End-Users, 32 RES. POL‘Y 157 
(2003); Christoph Hienerth, The Commercialization Of User Innovations: The Development of 
the Rodeo Kayak Industry, 36 R&D MGMT. 273, 274 (2006).  
 17. See, e.g., Lars B. Jeppesen & Lars Frederiksen, Why Do Users Contribute to Firm-
Hosted User Communities? The Case of Computer-Controlled Music, 17 ORG. SCI. 45 (2006). 
 18. See generally VON HIPPEL, supra note 5, at 11–13. 
 19. For an explanation of how firms address open innovation challenges using open 
source software, see Joel West & Scott Gallagher, Challenges of Open Innovation: The 
Paradox of Firm Investment in Open-Source Software, 36 R&D MGMT. 319 (2006). 
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attracts a host of new and existing competitors who seek to improve 
upon the original breakthrough. 
The cumulative innovation literature considers the role of this 
interdependence of producers and the consequential flows of 
information within an industry for developing and refining a new 
technology. Building upon the ―collective invention‖ work of Robert 
Allen,
20
 this stream is most recently associated with the work of 
Suzanne Scotchmer.
21
 
This body of work considers two different manifestations of 
cumulative innovation. In the first, various parties successively refine 
a single technology until the improved technology is widely used by 
a range of producers.
22
 Two well-documented examples of 
cooperation among competitors during the English industrial 
revolution are the blast furnace
23
 and the Cornish mining pump.
24
 
This pattern continued into the 20th century with the development of 
lasers
25
 and open source software.
26
 Such shared leadership of 
technological progress—a diversified innovation base—means that 
progress does not depend on any one individual or firm. In many 
cases, this diversified base is essential to both the development and 
production of these innovations. 
Cumulative innovation also can result from the combined 
innovation efforts of multiple users. A number of the aforementioned 
studies on user innovation center on the cumulative effects of a 
community of users, each building upon the other‘s efforts.27 These 
combined efforts correspond to both user and cumulative innovation. 
The other pattern of cumulative innovation occurs when firms 
build upon a common, ever-increasing pool of enabling science, even 
 
 20. See generally Robert C. Allen, Collective Invention, 4 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 1 
(1983). 
 21. SCOTCHMER, supra note 6; Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: 
Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29 (1991). 
 22. Allen, supra note 20, at 1–2. 
 23. See generally Allen, supra note 20. 
 24. See generally Alessandro Nuvolari, Collective Invention During the British Industrial 
Revolution: The Case of the Cornish Pumping Engine, 28 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 347 (2004). 
 25. See SCOTCHMER, supra note 6, at 127–29. 
 26. See Murray & O‘Mahony, supra note 6, at 1013–15. 
 27. See, e.g., Hienerth, supra note 16 (discussing cumulative user innovation in the rodeo 
kayak industry). 
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if their specific products are unique point products. The best-known 
example of this is biopharmaceutical drug discovery.
28
 
In some cases, cumulative innovation is fueled by explicit 
cooperation between firms; in other cases, an industry‘s joint 
innovation is advanced through unintended spillovers and 
information flows among the firms in the industry. In the latter case, 
cumulative innovation happens to the degree to which it is permitted 
by intellectual property (―IP‖) policies: Firms use whatever 
information is available to develop their innovations. Thus, IP 
monopolies tend to slow the rate of innovation and progress.
29
 At 
best, such innovation drag delays the pace of developing and 
diffusing an innovation. 
At worst, this drag can create a negative-sum innovation standoff. 
An extreme example of such a standoff is given by the development 
of vacuum tubes in the early 20th century.
30
 After the diode tube was 
invented and patented by Guglielmo Marconi, Lee De Forest 
improved the design by adding a third element to form a triode.
31
 But 
because the triode infringed on Marconi‘s patent, U.S. courts ruled 
that neither De Forest nor Marconi could legally sell a triode without 
a license from the other, which each side refused to grant.
32
 
Development of the U.S. broadcasting industry was blocked until the 
stalemate was resolved.
33
 
C. Chesbrough: Open Innovation 
Like cumulative and user innovation, open innovation builds upon 
the assumption of dispersed capabilities for identifying and 
implementing innovations.
34
 Although user innovation and 
 
 28. The cumulative nature of drug discovery is discussed by SCOTCHMER, supra note 6, 
and Murray & O‘Mahony, supra note 6, at 1011–13. 
 29. See Scotchmer, supra note 21, at 32–35. 
 30. ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR 
BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO 
ABOUT IT 50–51 (2004). 
 31. Id. at 51. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Carole E. Scott, The Radio Inventor/Entrepreneurs, BUS. QUEST, 2001, http://www. 
westga.edu/~bquest/2001/radio.htm. 
 34. Key definitions of the domain of open innovation are provided by CHESBROUGH, 
supra note 3, at xvii–xxxi, and Henry Chesbrough, Open Innovation: A New Paradigm for 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol30/iss1/3
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cumulative innovation focus on consumer welfare, the open 
innovation paradigm emphasizes the opportunities for profit and 
competitive advantage by individual firms. These differing 
assumptions and emphases cause the contrasting approaches to 
examine the same phenomenon and reach different conclusions. 
Chesbrough defines open innovation as  
[T]he use of purposive inflows and outflows of knowledge to 
accelerate internal innovation, and expand the markets for 
external use of innovation, respectively. [This paradigm] 
assumes that firms can and should use external ideas as well as 
internal ideas, and internal and external paths to market, as 
they look to advance their technology.
35
 
In other words, innovation should be treated like any other input 
to the industrial firm—something that can be bought and sold on the 
open market, not just produced and used within the boundaries of the 
firm. Applying Oliver Williamson‘s transaction cost economics 
framework,
36
 under open innovation, firms use markets to 
supplement internal hierarchies as mechanisms for both sourcing and 
commercializing innovations. Using markets to source and 
commercialize innovations offers the benefits of competition and 
diversification of risk over the fully vertically integrated approach.  
In many cases, however, the relationships are not one-time atomic 
transactions but a series of ongoing relationships corresponding to 
Powell‘s network form of organization.37 In fact, the production of 
many complex products inherently depends on the cooperation of 
firms within a value network.
38
 Such value networks are quite 
 
Understanding Industrial Innovation, in OPEN INNOVATION: RESEARCHING A NEW PARADIGM, 
supra note 3, at 1. 
 35. Chesbrough, supra note 34, at 1. Chesbrough‘s usage of ―open innovation‖ is today 
the most common, but not the only usage of the term. In some cases, the reference to ―open‖ 
innovation indicates a generic form of openness. See, e.g., Lee Fleming & David M. 
Waguespack, Brokerage, Boundary Spanning, and Leadership in Open Innovation 
Communities, 18 ORG. SCI. 165 (2007). 
 36. This framework is set out in OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS 
OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 15–42 (1985). 
 37. See Walter W. Powell, Neither Market Nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of 
Organization, 12 RES. ORG. BEHAV. 295 (1990). 
 38. For a synthesis of prior research on value networks and its applicability to open 
innovation, see Wim Vanhaverbeke, The Inter-organizational Context of Open Innovation, in 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 30:17 
 
 
common in systems-based industries. Where once vertical integration 
was the norm—as represented by IBM in computers or Motorola in 
cellular telephones—it has been supplanted by horizontal 
specialization, fueled by strong economies of scale for key 
components.
39
 The efficient subdivision of labor among key members 
of the value network is enabled by technical modularity.
40
 Innovation 
in such systems, however, often requires a firm or group of firms to 
lead and shape the innovation occurring within a value network.
41
 
II. POLICIES TO ENCOURAGE INTERORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION 
Even though the empirical record is still developing, researchers 
have provided evidence that interorganizational innovation can be 
faster, more efficient, and more diversified than the alternative 
approaches for developing and commercializing innovations. Policy-
makers thus should be concerned with the effect various public 
policies will have on the prevalence and effectiveness of 
interorganizational innovation.  
Most of the factors affecting buy-versus-make innovation 
decisions remain under the purview of individual firms. A number of 
policy decisions, however, can affect both the supply and cost of 
 
OPEN INNOVATION: RESEARCHING A NEW PARADIGM, supra note 3, at 210–15. The definition 
of ―value network‖ put forth by Vanhaverbeke (and others in the same volume) seems exactly 
equivalent to the business ―ecosystem‖ discussed in MARCO IANSITI & ROY LEVIEN, THE 
KEYSTONE ADVANTAGE: WHAT THE NEW DYNAMICS OF BUSINESS ECOSYSTEMS MEAN FOR 
STRATEGY, INNOVATION, AND SUSTAINABILITY 8–10 (2004), and, in fact, they cite this 
ecosystem research. Id. In contrast to the familiar Porter ―value chain,‖ see MICHAEL E. 
PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE: CREATING AND SUSTAINING SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE 
33–39 (1985), the open innovation value network includes other paths for value creation 
beyond the value chain, notably companies selling goods and services that are complementary 
to the value created by the focal firm. 
 39. See Joel West, Does Appropriability Enable or Retard Open Innovation?, in OPEN 
INNOVATION: RESEARCHING A NEW PARADIGM, supra note 3, at 109, 112–14; ANDREW S. 
GROVE, ONLY THE PARANOID SURVIVE: HOW TO EXPLOIT THE CRISIS POINTS THAT 
CHALLENGE EVERY COMPANY AND CAREER 48–52 (1996); THE BUSINESS OF SYSTEMS 
INTEGRATION, 206–11 (Andrea Prencipe et al. eds., 2003). 
 40. CARLISS Y. BALDWIN & KIM B. CLARK, DESIGN RULES, VOL. 1: THE POWER OF 
MODULARITY 364 (2000); Richard N. Langlois, Modularity in Technology and Organization, 
49 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 19, 23 (2003). 
 41. See Markku Maula, Thomas Keil & Jukka-Pekka Salmenkaita, Open Innovation in 
Systemic Innovation Contexts, in OPEN INNOVATION: RESEARCHING A NEW PARADIGM, supra 
note 3, at 241. 
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external innovations—and thus the likelihood that firms will consider 
and adopt such external innovations rather than developing their own, 
or not innovating at all.  
In this Article, I examine five policy levers: (1) intellectual 
property, (2) public funding of R&D, (3) public funding of 
infrastructure, (4) regulation of competition, and (5) taxation. I use 
these levers to show how both business strategies and policy choices 
are interpreted within the tenets of the three types of 
interorganizational innovation. 
A. Strength of the IP Regime 
The core research question for economic studies of cumulative 
innovation has been determining the appropriate type and strength of 
innovation incentives. Researchers seek to balance the need for 
adequate incentives to encourage investment in innovation with the 
need to reduce drag on the cumulative innovation that occurs between 
firms across a given industry or segment. Although Scotchmer 
discusses and evaluates alternative innovation incentives such as 
invention prizes,
42
 most of the research and policy discussion has 
focused on the appropriate strength of the IP protection 
mechanisms.
43
 
Below I consider the effects that strengthening (or weakening) 
patent and copyright protection might have on interorganizational 
innovation. The three theories of interorganizational innovation focus 
on different consequences of changing the strength of a national IP 
regime.
44
 
 
 42. SCOTCHMER, supra note 6, at 41–46. 
 43. See, e.g., JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 30; Howard F. Chang, Patent Scope, Antitrust 
Policy, and Cumulative Innovation, 26 RAND J. ECON. 34 (1995); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca 
S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 
SCIENCE 698 (1998); Adam B. Jaffe, The U.S. Patent System in Transition: Policy Innovation 
and the Innovation Process, 29 RES. POL‘Y 531 (2000). 
 44. See Table 2, infra. 
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1. Patent Regimes 
The United States and other developed economies have seen a 
wide range of proposals in the past decade for patent policy reform, 
many of which are intended to undo prior reforms that strengthened 
the enforceability of patents as an incentive for small inventors.
45
 
Some of these reforms would be quite modest, such as reducing 
protection for trivial ideas by making it easier to overturn weak 
patents.
46
 Other proposed changes are more dramatic. 
A fundamental concern of cumulative innovation is that an 
excessively broad grant of IP rights will shut down cumulative 
innovation because a second innovator building on the efforts of the 
first will lack the incentive to develop the necessary extensions and 
improvements.
47
 
Even if no individual firm has a monopoly on the IP, the 
collective IP rights positions of a group of firms can serve as a barrier 
to new entrants and thus to new innovation. In the case of European 
GSM mobile phone standards, the patent positions of Nokia, 
Ericsson, Siemens, Alcatel, and Motorola meant that no outside firm 
could produce a mobile phone without licensing the patents of all 
firms.
48
 As was intended by the incumbent producers, for many years 
this patent barrier excluded from the European market the Japanese 
manufacturers that were leading the world in miniaturization.
49
 In 
 
 45. A complete review of the recent criticisms and proposals for reform is beyond the 
scope of this Article. For recent economic analyses of the problems in the current U.S. patent 
system, including those caused by patent ―reforms‖ of the 1980s and 1990s, and proposals for 
counter-reform, see JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 30, at 151–69; Nancy Gallini, The Economics 
of Patents: Lessons from Recent U.S. Patent Reform, 16 J. ECON. PERSP. 131 (2002); Carl 
Shapiro, Patent Reform: Aligning Reward and Contribution (National Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. W13141, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=989952. 
 46. Examples of such reforms can be seen in JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 30, at 170–207; 
Stuart J.H. Graham & Dietmar Harhoff, Can Post-Grant Reviews Improve Patent System 
Design? A Twin Study of US and European Patents 4 (Centre for Econ. Pol‘y Research, 
Discussion Paper No. 5680, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=921826. 
 47. Scotchmer, supra note 21, at 32. 
 48. For a discussion of the role of patents in the GSM standard and as a barrier to entry, 
see RUDI BEKKERS, MOBILE TELECOMMUNICATIONS STANDARDS: GSM, UMTS, TETRA, AND 
ERMES 321–27 (2001). 
 49. The rapid rate of improvements in size and weight by Japanese cell phone 
manufacturers is documented in Jeffrey L. Funk, Standards, Dominant Designs and 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol30/iss1/3
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fact, the barriers posed by GSM patents were not widely known until 
they were used against Sendo, a British startup founded in 1999: in 
March 2005, Ericsson sued Sendo for patent infringement; Sendo 
brought a counter-complaint to the European Commission, which 
was not resolved before the company went out of business three 
months later.
50
 Despite this protection, of the four European 
incumbents, only Nokia remained in the handset business: Siemens 
and Alcatel sold their money-losing handset divisions to smaller 
Asian rivals, and Ericsson combined its operations in a joint venture 
with Tokyo-based Sony.
51
 
Thus, decreasing the scope or duration of patent claims would 
recognize and encourage the practice of cumulative innovation within 
an industry. Such changes, however, could decrease the attractiveness 
of business models based on developing and licensing IP to external 
customers, a key strategy available within open innovation.
52
 Because 
such licensing models are controversial, some stakeholders would 
view the end of open innovation as a good thing. 
2. Copyright 
Concerns about strong IP regimes deterring interorganizational 
innovation are not limited to patent policy. In some ways, copyright 
is the area of greatest policy experimentation, as right-holders 
experiment by unilaterally granting additional rights within existing 
national policy. These rights are designed to encourage 
experimentation in user or cumulative innovation.  
The initial experiments came with the creation of licenses for free 
and open source software.
53
 The free software movement and the 
 
Preferential Acquisition of Complementary Assets Through Slight Information Advantages, 32 
RES. POL‘Y 1325, 1331–34 (2003). 
 50. For a discussion of Ericsson‘s patent infringement lawsuit against Sendo and Sendo‘s 
complaint to the European Commission, see Sean Jackson, When Sendo Met Ericsson, MOBILE 
COMM. INT‘L, Apr. 1, 2005. 
 51. For a post-mortem on Sendo after its sale to Motorola, see id.; Mike Dano, Motorola 
Buys Sendo’s R&D, Patents, RCR WIRELESS NEWS, July 4, 2005. For a summary of the GSM 
patent situation, as well as a chronology of the exit by the three European cell phone makers, 
see West, supra note 39, at 125–28. 
 52. The role of patent licensing as part of an open innovation strategy was first outlined 
by CHESBROUGH, supra note 3, at 155–76. 
 53. For a complete treatment of the use of copyright and contract law in open source 
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open source software movement share similar technical approaches 
but different underlying philosophies.
54
 Free software is explicitly 
predicated on a user innovation model.
55
 Open source software is 
designed to facilitate what is now called open innovation—creating 
shared IP that can be used as a source of external innovations by for-
profit entities.
56
 Both approaches enable cumulative innovation, for 
the copyright licenses explicitly encourage sharing and thus further 
decentralize the innovation process. Not all open source software 
strategies, however, are open innovation or vice versa.
57
 
An entire class of literary or artistic expression, typically covered 
by copyright, is based upon recombining, elaborating upon, or 
satirizing prior art;
58
 a common example is the creation of new songs 
that incorporate digital samples of one or more prior songs.
59
 
Although such recombinations have been blocked by some rights 
holders, other rights holders have sought to encourage 
recombinations. The ―creative commons‖ licenses are intended to 
facilitate this form of interorganizational innovation; they build upon 
the concepts and principles developed for free and open source 
licenses.
60
 
Like stronger patent regimes, stronger copyright regimes can 
discourage the practice of cumulative innovation or delay it by 
introducing a high degree of uncertainty to the process. On the other 
 
licenses, see generally LAWRENCE ROSEN, OPEN SOURCE LICENSING: SOFTWARE FREEDOM 
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2004). 
 54. See Jason Dedrick & Joel West, Movement Ideology vs. User Pragmatism in the 
Organizational Adoption of Open Source Software, in COMPUTERIZATION MOVEMENTS AND 
TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION: FROM MAINFRAMES TO UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING 427 (Kenneth L. 
Kraemer & Margaret Elliott eds., 2008). 
 55. See Eric von Hippel, Innovation by User Communities: Learning from Open-Source 
Software, 42 SLOAN MGMT. REV. 82 (2001). 
 56. Behlendorf, supra note 13; Joel West & Scott Gallagher, Patterns of Open Innovation 
in Open Source Software, in OPEN INNOVATION: RESEARCHING A NEW PARADIGM, supra note 
3, at 82, 91. 
 57. For an explanation of the orthogonal typologies of open source and open innovation, 
see West & Gallagher, supra note 56, at 101–02. 
 58. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE 
LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 24 (2004), available at http:// 
www.free-culture.cc. 
 59. For a discussion of digital mixing of film, music, and other media, see id. at 105–06. 
 60. A summary of the goals of Creative Commons can be found in Lawrence Lessig, The 
Creative Commons, 65 MONT. L. REV. 1 (2004). 
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hand, weaker copyright regimes can shift incentives away from 
unique contributions toward more derivative ones. As with other 
weaker IP regimes, lack of effective copyright protection particularly 
will reduce innovation by smaller firms that lack the ability to 
directly commercialize their innovation.
61
 
The creation of new copyright licenses (open source, free 
software, and creative commons) shows that the existing copyright 
law can be used to facilitate, rather than deter, cumulative innovation, 
but court tests of these mechanisms remain scarce.
62
 
B. Funding and Managing Public R&D 
Another heavily debated and studied area of innovation policy 
during the past twenty years concerns government-funded 
innovations. The debate focuses on the level of funding and the 
allocation of rights but also considers policies related to developing, 
managing, and diffusing such innovations. 
The role of government R&D funding in fueling 
interorganizational innovation comes in two major ways: through 
spillovers of government-funded research, and through direct 
commercialization of innovations developed with government 
funding.  
1. Research Spillovers 
Innovations from government research labs, government-funded 
university projects, and other public sources (including university-
funded research) were traditionally allowed to spillover freely to the 
private sector in a model Chesbrough termed an ―innovation 
benefactor.‖63 Such funding for innovation is a public good provided 
 
 61. See David J. Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for 
Integration, Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL‘Y 285, 297 (1986). 
 62. The scarcity of court tests is remarked most recently by Mark Driver. Posting of Mark 
Driver to Gartner, http://blogs.gartner.com/mark_driver/2009/01/27/open-source-lawsuit-
makes- it-to-court/ (Jan. 27, 2009) (posting entitled ―Open Source Lawsuit Makes It to Court‖). 
 63. Henry W. Chesbrough, The Era of Open Innovation, 44 SLOAN MGMT. REV. 35, 38–
39 (2003). For many, an ―open‖ model of innovation (which is not necessarily ―open 
innovation‖) refers to this ―innovation benefactor‖ model of non-monetized information flows 
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to promote societal welfare.
64
 This approach should increase 
cumulative innovation, for the public spillovers to a wide range of 
commercial actors diversify the supply of potential innovators who 
can build on that public science. 
In the United States, the government‘s role as the largest 
innovation benefactor was cemented during World War II, when the 
Office of Scientific Research and Development funneled government 
money to fund R&D in universities and private industry.
65
 Under the 
direction of OSRD chairman Vannevar Bush, postwar research 
funding was divided into two categories: basic and applied.
66
 Broad 
categories of basic research were funded by the National Science 
Foundation, which was created in 1950 ―to promote the progress of 
science; to advance the national health, prosperity, and welfare; and 
to secure the national defense.‖67 Meanwhile, the National Institutes 
of Health were created in 1948 to consolidate various public health 
research activities dating back to 1798.
68
  
For the first three decades of the postwar electronics industry, 
however, the largest source of research spillovers came from military 
funding of university research.
69
 This funding led to technological 
innovation and major business opportunities in semiconductors, 
digital computers, software, data communications, and 
 
but explicitly excludes the emphasis of Chesbrough‘s work (especially CHESBROUGH, supra 
note 3) on buying and selling innovations. 
 64. See Joel West, Wim Vanhaverbeke & Henry Chesbrough, Open Innovation: A 
Research Agenda, in OPEN INNOVATION: RESEARCHING A NEW PARADIGM, supra note 3, at 
285, 300. 
 65. The federal government accounted for the majority of U.S. R&D spending from the 
1950s through the end of the 1970s. See Adam B. Jaffe, Trends and Patterns in Research and 
Development Expenditures in the United States, 93 PROC. NAT‘L ACADEMIES SCI. U.S. AM. 
12658 (1996). 
 66. VANNEVAR BUSH, SCIENCE THE ENDLESS FRONTIER (1945) (report to the President by 
the Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development). 
 67. NAT‘L SCI. FOUND., Historical Background of the National Science Foundation, FY 
1952 BUDGET REP., app. I (1952), available at http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/1952/; see also NAT‘L 
SCI. FOUND., Legislative History of the NSF Act of 1950, FY 1952 BUDGET REP., app. II (1952), 
available at http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/1952/.  
 68. NAT‘L INST. OF HEALTH, THE NIH ALAMANAC-HISTORICAL DATA (2008), available 
at http://www.nih.gov/about/almanac/historical/chronology_of_events.htm. 
 69. A comprehensive summary of the role of the U.S. government in funding computer 
research from ENIAC into the 1980s is presented by KENNETH FLAMM, CREATING THE 
COMPUTER: GOVERNMENT, INDUSTRY, AND HIGH TECHNOLOGY 29–51 (1988). 
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telecommunications.
70
 The government funded major research 
projects at elite universities, both directly and through the Joint 
Services Electronics Program.
71
 Spillovers of government funding to 
universities helped to create key aspects of the U.S. computer 
industry, including: 
 Univac I. After using Army funding to build the ENIAC I 
at the University of Pennsylvania, Professor John Mauchly 
and student J. Presper Eckert left the university and went on 
to launch what became the Eckert-Mauchly Computer 
Corporation; in 1950, this corporation built the Univac I, 
the first digital computer ever sold for civilian use.
72
 
 Core Memory. Beginning in 1944, the Office of Naval 
Research funded Project Whirlwind computer research at 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (―MIT‖).73 
Among other things, the project invented the magnetic core 
memory that was used commercially in IBM‘s 704 and 705 
computers and nearly all computers for the next twenty-five 
years.
74
 In one of the rare exceptions to free university 
spillovers, MIT earned $22 million in patent royalties on 
core memory (mostly from IBM).
75
 
 IBM’s mainframe dominance. MIT‘s successor to 
Whirlwind was incorporated into Project SAGE, a massive 
air defense radar system developed by MIT, IBM, and the 
RAND Corporation from 1952–1958.76 During SAGE‘s 
peak in the 1950s, 25% of IBM employees worked on the 
 
 70. See id. 
 71. Leo Young, Electronics and Computing, 502 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 
82, 86–88 (1989). 
 72. See FLAMM, supra note 69.  
 73. KARL L. WILDES & NILO A. LINDGREN, A CENTURY OF ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING 
AND COMPUTER SCIENCE AT MIT, 1882–1982, at 289 (1985). 
 74. Project Whirlwind, core memory, and the SAGE air defense system are discussed in 
WILDES & LINDGREN, id. at 296–300, and in Chapter 4 of NAT‘L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
FUNDING A REVOLUTION: GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR COMPUTING RESEARCH 92–95 (1999). 
 75. ROBERT BUDERI, THE INVENTION THAT CHANGED THE WORLD: HOW A SMALL 
GROUP OF RADAR PIONEERS WON THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND LAUNCHED A 
TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION 403 (1996). 
 76. WILDES & LINDGREN, supra note 73, at 299–300. 
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project, and it accounted for half of IBM‘s computer 
revenues.
77
 IBM‘s president later credited the project with 
allowing IBM to surpass Univac once and for all.
78
 
 Airline Reservation Systems. IBM adapted the SAGE 
hardware to build SABRE, the American Airlines 
reservation system dubbed ―Kid‘s SAGE,‖ which was the 
largest ever commercial systems development project at the 
time of its completion in 1964.
79
 
 Digital Equipment Corporation. Kenneth Olsen did his 
1952 MIT master‘s thesis on core memory and then worked 
at MIT Lincoln Lab monitoring IBM‘s manufacturing of 
the SAGE computers.
80
 In 1957, he left Lincoln Lab, started 
DEC, and began work on the PDP-1, the first of nine 
minicomputer models that the firm would ship during the 
next two decades.
81
 
 Internet. Defense Department funding of the ARPANET 
from 1968 to 1990 produced a military communications 
network that was robust against military attack; this 
network also provided the infrastructure and standards later 
used to build the commercial Internet, which in turn fueled 
an explosive wave of innovation during the 1990s.
82
 
 Open Source Operating Systems. As a side effect of 
government funding to develop these networking protocols, 
the University of California–Berkeley developed the BSD 
 
 77. Project SAGE is discussed by BUDERI, supra note 75, at 380–406, and by WILDES & 
LINDGREN, supra note 73, at 299–300. The impact of Project SAGE upon IBM‘s business is 
recounted in MARTIN CAMPBELL-KELLY, FROM AIRLINE RESERVATIONS TO SONIC THE 
HEDGEHOG: A HISTORY OF THE SOFTWARE INDUSTRY 38 (2003), as well as in THOMAS J. 
WATSON, JR. & PETER PETRE, FATHER, SON & CO.: MY LIFE AT IBM AND BEYOND 229–34 
(1991). 
 78. Tom Watson, Jr., later wrote: ―SAGE . . . gave IBM the giant boost I was after. . . . [I]t 
enabled us to build highly automated factories ahead of anybody else, and to train thousands of 
new workers in electronics.‖ WATSON & PETRE, supra note 77, at 233. 
 79. CAMPBELL-KELLY, supra note 77, at 41–45. 
 80. WILDES & LINDGREN, supra note 73, at 298. 
 81. Id. at 232. 
 82. David C. Mowery & Tim Simcoe, Is the Internet a US Invention? An Economic and 
Technological History of Computer Networking, 31 RES. POL‘Y 1369, 1372–75 (2002). 
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variant of Unix, which helped diffuse the TCP/IP protocols 
and provided key operating system components later used 
by Sun Microsystems, Linux, and Apple‘s OS X.83  
The impact of defense spillovers on the electronics industry was 
not limited to computing technologies. The military funded key 
university research in semiconductors and integrated circuits that 
later became commonplace in industry, including new materials, 
solid-state circuits, and computer-aided circuit design.
84
 Meanwhile, 
digital communications were developed through a combination of 
Department of Defense (―DoD‖)-funded basic research and NASA-
funded applications for deep space communications, which together 
enabled the creation of digital cellular phones.
85
 
During the heyday of the 1960s, the bulk of federally funded 
research was tied to building complex systems for military uses and 
the space program, but the relative importance of such systems 
declined during the 1970s to 1990s.
86
 Although government R&D 
funding supported the U.S. information technology sector during the 
1960s and 1970s, the relative importance of federal R&D funding 
began a steep decline starting in 1988.
87
  
2. Direct Commercialization 
If the Internet epitomized the free spillover of university research 
to aid private innovation, the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980
88
 represented 
the exact opposite philosophy. It assumed that the most effective path 
 
 83. The role of the DoD-funded BSD Unix in the evolution of Unix and Linux is 
discussed in Joel West & Jason Dedrick, Open Source Standardization: The Rise of Linux in the 
Network Era, 14 KNOWLEDGE, TECH., & POL‘Y 88, 93–94 (2001). A continuation of that 
discussion—linking it forward to Apple‘s OS X operating system—can be found in Joel West, 
How Open Is Open Enough? Melding Proprietary and Open Source Platform Strategies, 32 
RES. POL‘Y 1259, 1270–72 (2003). 
 84. Young, supra note 71, at 89. 
 85. Joel West, Commercializing Open Science: Deep Space Communications as the Lead 
Market for Shannon Theory, 1960–1973, 45 J. MGMT. STUD. 1506, 1522 (2008). 
 86. See Adam B. Jaffe, Trends and Patterns in Research and Development Expenditures 
in the United States, 93 PROC. NAT‘L. ACAD. SCI. 12658 (1996). 
 87. See Kira R. Fabrizio & David C. Mowery, Defense-Related R&D and the Growth of 
the Postwar Information Technology Industrial Complex in the United States, 12 REVUE 
D‘ECONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE 27, 28 (2005). 
 88. 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–211 (2000). 
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for commercializing university inventions was not through free 
spillovers from universities to industries, but rather through creating 
economic incentive for universities to commercialize their 
inventions.
89
 Thus, the Act encouraged universities to patent 
innovations developed using federal money and then to license those 
innovations to private firms.
90
 In open innovation terms, universities 
are thus transformed from innovation benefactors to innovation 
merchants.
91
 
As with open innovation, direct commercialization assumes that 
strong incentives are needed to develop and commercialize 
innovations—specifically, that universities will not aid technology 
transfer and commercialization absent limitations on drag created by 
patenting public science. One study concluded that universities‘ 
attempts to capitalize on their innovations can potentially provide 
returns to the university, but that these attempts also create 
innovation drag and slow the process of cumulative innovation.
92
 
Others have argued that the overall empirical record is mixed and can 
be interpreted to either support or refute the predictions that 
innovation drag will slow the process of interorganizational 
innovation.
93
 
C. Competition Policy 
Although interorganizational innovation normally will promote a 
diversity of innovation sources and thus be pro-competitive, under 
certain conditions the associated industry structure might run afoul of 
antitrust or other national competition policies. In this section, I 
highlight three cases: a component-based open innovation model, 
 
 89. Id. 
 90. The rate of increased patenting by U.S. universities predates the Bayh-Dole Act, and 
thus the Act is both a reflection and a cause of a shift in the availability of free innovation 
spillovers. See David C. Mowery & Bhaven N. Sampat, University Patents and Patent Policy 
Debates in the USA, 1925–1980, 10 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 781, 782–83 (2001). 
 91. See Chesbrough, supra note 63, at 41; West et al., supra note 64, at 291. 
 92. Kira Fabrizio, The Use of University Research in Firm Innovation, in OPEN 
INNOVATION: RESEARCHING A NEW PARADIGM, supra note 3, at 134, 157. 
 93. Among the most vociferously agnostic are Charles R. McManis & Sucheol Noh, The 
Impact of the Bayh-Dole Act on Genetic Research and Development: Evaluating the Arguments 
and Empirical Evidence to Date (Wash. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper, 2007), available at 
http://law.wustl.edu/crie/index.asp?ID=5906. 
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open standards, and explicit attempts to create cumulative innovation 
through R&D consortia or other efforts at R&D pooling. 
1. Horizontal Component Monopolies 
As noted by Grove, an alternative to the vertical integration in the 
information and communications technology (―ICT‖) industry (as 
with mainframe computers) is a component-integration model 
represented by microprocessor and operating system vendors 
supplying to personal computer makers.
94
 Through increased 
volumes and market share, and by supplying to a wide range of 
competing vendors, successful component producers enjoy a range of 
supply- and demand-side economies of scale that tend to create quasi-
monopolies in a given product category or segment.
95
 
No matter how lawfully obtained, such successful quasi-
monopolies are subject to antitrust scrutiny—particularly in Europe, 
where (unlike in the United States) competition policy considers the 
impact of market power on competitors, not just on consumers.
96
 The 
small number of high profile cases against dominant component 
suppliers such as Microsoft, Intel, and Qualcomm makes it hard to 
generalize as to the broader impact of competition policy on future 
component/integration business models. Existing competition policy 
clearly seeks to limit the business strategies of component suppliers 
that achieve a dominant position in their segment. Both case law and 
regulatory policy, however, remain unsettled, in part because the 
economic effects of curtailing, restricting, or banning horizontal 
monopolies remain contested.
97
 
Meanwhile, in response to antitrust criticisms, these component 
suppliers have sought to enlist allies from among their customers, 
particularly medium-sized and smaller buyers. These are the 
 
 94. GROVE, supra note 39, at 41–42. 
 95. Id. at 52. 
 96. One comparison of recent U.S. and E.U. competition policy is given by John P. 
Jennings, Comparing the US and EU Microsoft Antitrust Prosecutions: How Level is the 
Playing Field?, 2 ERASMUS L. & ECON. REV. 71 (2006). 
 97. As but one example, two prominent industrial economists presented contradictory 
assessments of the 1998–1999 United States v. Microsoft trial. See Franklin M. Fisher & Daniel 
L. Rubinfeld, United States v. Microsoft: An Economic Analysis, in DID MICROSOFT HARM 
CONSUMERS? TWO OPPOSING VIEWS 1 (David S. Evans et al. eds., 2000). 
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customers who most benefit from the availability of components and 
thus open innovation, for they would otherwise lack the scale and 
innovation capabilities to compete with large vertically integrated 
incumbents. The archetypal example is Dell Computer, formed by 
Michael Dell in 1983 in his college dormitory: The availability of 
off-the-shelf components allowed Dell to ship personal computers in 
competition with IBM.
98
 By combining external sources of 
innovation with a ruthless focus on manufacturing efficiencies, 
within a decade, Dell left the vertically integrated IBM unable to 
compete on cost; IBM‘s losses eventually drove it out of the ―IBM 
PC‖ computer business in 2004.99 
2. Open Standards 
Although there are many definitions of ―open‖ standards, the 
fundamental issue is whether a standard facilitates entry and thus 
competition between rival suppliers.
100
 Open entry facilitates the 
cumulative innovation of a broad innovation base, producing related 
(if not directly competing) products in a given industry segment or 
category.
101
 
In setting competition policy for standardization efforts, regulators 
face conflicting imperatives based on the interests of various 
stakeholders.
102
 For example, if the government approves a sharing of  
 
 98. Dell later wrote: ―My Dad started. . . . ‗Get your priorities straight. What do you want 
to do with your life?‘ ‗I want to compete with IBM!‘ I said.‖ MICHAEL DELL, DIRECT FROM 
DELL 10 (1999). 
 99. In 1992, one analyst estimated that matching Dell‘s prices would have brought IBM 
annual losses exceeding $1 billion. Andrew Kupfer, Who’s Winning the PC Price Wars? 
FORTUNE, Sept. 21, 1992. In December 2004, IBM decided to sell its PC division to China‘s 
Lenovo after experiencing PC division losses of $965 million during the previous three and a 
half years. Nick Baker, IBM’s PC Business Unprofitable Since at Least 2001, DOW JONES 
NEWSWIRES, Dec. 31, 2004. 
 100. For the economic implications of open standards, see Joel West, The Economic 
Realities of Open Standards: Black, White and Many Shades of Gray, in STANDARDS AND 
PUBLIC POLICY 87–122 (Shane Greenstein & Victor Stango eds., 2006). A proposal to 
operationalize definitions of open standards can be found in Ken Krechmer, Open Standards 
Requirements, 4 INT‘L J. IT STANDARDS & STANDARDIZATION RES. 43 (2006). 
 101. West, supra note 100, at 88. 
 102. Id. at 96–98. 
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patent rights (e.g., by patent pool or cross-licensing)
103—thus creating 
a patent cartel—it could facilitate cooperation among existing 
vendors at the expense of potential new entrants, or it could leverage 
this collusion to transfer rents from buyers to this cartel of 
producers.
104
 
Irrespective of their regulatory role, government buyers (like other 
buyers) also can adopt policies favoring the production of goods 
based on open standards to encourage their provision, as happened in 
the open systems movement of the 1980s and 1990s.
105
 
3. R&D Consortia 
Another potential source of external innovations for firms is 
through cooperative R&D among suppliers, customers, and 
competitors. In this model, the R&D typically is funded by a 
consortium, and the consortium members share in its returns. Such 
prior agreements on research cooperation protect later inventors from 
hold-up by earlier ones, thus enabling the process of cumulative 
innovation.
106
 
Any cooperation among competitors, however, is fraught with 
antitrust implications, thus generating many billable hours (and an 
occasional cancelled consortium) for attorneys seeking to navigate 
potential minefields. In the United States, R&D consortia were 
explicitly authorized by the National Cooperative Research Act of 
1984 (―NCRA‖), which reversed a policy decision of the 1890 
Sherman Antitrust Act that banned such cooperation between direct 
competitors.
107
 Although NCRA-compliant consortia often include 
just two direct competitors (a form of cumulative innovation), the 
cooperation may span an open innovation value network of 
 
 103. For a discussion of patent pools, see Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent 
Settlements, 34 RAND J. ECON. 391 (2003). 
 104. Id. 
 105. See Jim Isaak, The Role of Individuals and Social Capital in POSIX Standardization, 
4 INT‘L J. IT STANDARDS & STANDARDIZATION RES. 1, 1–23 (2006) 
 106. Scotchmer, supra note 21, at 32. 
 107. William M. Evan & Paul Olk, R&D Consortia: A New U.S. Organizational Form, 31 
SLOAN MGMT. REV. 37, 37–45 (1990) (noting that although collaborative innovation in the 
United States required an act of Congress to eliminate antitrust concerns, such collaborative 
innovation was not considered illegal in Western Europe or Japan). 
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competitors, suppliers, and customers. Such was the case with the 
Plastics Recycling Foundation, which included makers of plastics and 
plastic-based packaging, as well as major buyers of such 
packaging.
108
 Presumably, the direct involvement of industrial buyers 
would vitiate concerns that collaborative R&D is anti-competitive 
and harmful to the interests of buyers. 
Antitrust issues presumably would be less in consortia where 
innovation benefits spill over to participants and non-participants 
alike, as with open source software consortia.
109
 The applicability of 
this form for shared R&D, however, has yet to be expanded beyond 
software production. 
D. Promoting Public Infrastructure 
The Internet is perhaps the most successful publicly funded 
innovation infrastructure of the past century, and it provides an 
example of the role that government can play in the provision of 
common or non-rivalrous goods, particularly in cases where it would 
be impractical or inefficient for a private party to capture tolls for use 
of the infrastructure.
110
 The success of the Internet suggests that 
public funding for innovative infrastructure can under some 
circumstances facilitate processes of interorganizational innovation 
by encouraging the widest possible range of innovation contributions. 
There are at least three mechanisms by which that innovation is 
facilitated. 
First, as with other publicly funded research, public spillovers and 
lack of appropriability can fuel a virtuous cycle of adoption and 
enhancements. For the Internet, these spillovers encouraged entry by 
innovative users, suppliers, complementers, and rivals of existing 
firms. Such entry was further facilitated by the procurement policies 
of the U.S. government, which favored entry into data networking by 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. West & Gallagher, supra note 19, at 322–24. 
 110. Discussions of the role of government in providing shared infrastructure can be found 
in Brett M. Frischmann, Infrastructure Commons in Economic Perspective, 12 FIRST MONDAY 
6 (2007), and Steven J. Jackson, Paul N. Edwards, Geoffrey C. Bowker & Cory P. Knobel, 
Understanding Infrastructure: History, Heuristics, and Cyberinfrastructure Policy, 12 FIRST 
MONDAY 6 (2007). 
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small firms and did not allow the technological designs of any firm to 
dominate the architecture.
111
 
Additionally, the process of standardizing infrastructure interfaces 
generally follows the best practices for multilateral standards setting 
organizations (―SSOs‖).112 As such, it benefits from well-developed 
policies of these SSOs, which generally have been designed to 
facilitate a cumulative innovation process within an industry segment 
across a wide range of industry participants. The most successful 
example of information infrastructure, the Internet, created new 
forms of standardization, notably the Internet Engineering Task 
Force, which used new processes that were in many ways more open 
than earlier SSOs.
113
 
Finally, such a process of interorganizational standardization 
creates alternatives to vertical integration and thus opportunities for 
open innovation. Well-defined interfaces enable interorganizational 
modularity and facilitate a division of labor across organizational 
boundaries.
114
 This interorganizational standardization could 
potentially help to create component or systems markets between 
providers of different pieces of the infrastructure. 
E. Tax Policy 
Tax deductions or credits encourage firms to invest in R&D, but 
how tax incentives are structured may change the relative 
attractiveness of internal versus external R&D. In the typical scenario 
of large profitable firms buying from smaller and younger startups, as 
in major pharmaceutical firms buying from biotech startups, 
incentives that favor small firms would increase the supply of 
external innovations. Examples of incentives favoring small firms 
include caps on incentive payments per firm, as well as the use of tax 
credits instead of deductions (the latter being less useful for small 
firms that pay lower tax rates or may be unprofitable). 
 
 111. Mowery & Simcoe, supra note 82. 
 112. Joel West, Seeking Open Infrastructure: Contrasting Open Standards, Open Source 
and Open Innovation, 12 FIRST MONDAY 6 (2007). 
 113. Scott Bradner, The Internet Engineering Task Force, in OPEN SOURCES: VOICES FROM 
A REVOLUTION, supra note 13, at 47–52. 
 114. Langlois, supra note 40. 
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The attractiveness of external sources of innovation can also be 
affected by state policies, such as the highly controversial proposals 
by states to increase revenues by taxing services.
115
 A state sales tax 
on services assessed on contract R&D would make external 
innovations more expensive and thus less attractive than those traded 
within the firm. Conversely, a tax policy that treated royalties more 
favorably than contract services might allow external innovation to 
continue unimpeded, at least for firms that anticipate tax issues in 
contracting for such external innovations. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Interorganizational innovation is a reality of the modern industrial 
world. We tend to think of this innovation as a recent phenomenon, 
born of the Internet technology that has enabled global virtual 
collaboration. Such collaboration, however, has been common in 
industrial districts for centuries, and although records are scarce, it 
likely existed within medieval guilds before that. That said, the 
combined personal computer revolution of the 1980s and the Internet 
revolution of the 1990s have democratized such innovation by 
making writing, software production, music composition, video 
editing, and a wide array of other creative activities available to 
anyone with access to a PC.
116
 
In modern or medieval times, the policy tradeoffs for encouraging 
innovation remain the same: maximizing the incentives for specific 
firms or individuals to innovate while minimizing the cumulative 
drag on the remaining pool of potential innovators. Policy decisions 
need to be informed by broader and deeper empirical evidence on 
both sides of this tradeoff. 
 
 115. Federation of Tax Administrators, FTA Survey of Services Taxation—Update, 
http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/pub/services/btn/0708.html (last visited May 13, 2009). 
 116. See, e.g., Jonathan Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1974, 1974–
2040 (2006). 
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TABLE 1: SOURCES OF INNOVATION IN CONTRASTING THEORIES 
OF INNOVATION 
Theory Key Author Focal Firm Suppliers Customers Rivals 
Vertical 
integration 
Alfred Chandler X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
User 
innovation 
Eric von Hippel X † X 
 
 
Cumulative 
innovation 
Suzanne Scotchmer  X 
 
 
 
 
X 
Open 
innovation 
Henry Chesbrough X X X X 
† Not emphasized by subsequent research 
TABLE 2: INTERORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION PREDICTIONS 
FOR IP POLICY CHANGES 
Theory Assumptions/Focus Effect of Stronger IP Regime 
Vertical 
integration 
Firms gain advantage by 
controlling end-to-end 
innovation pipeline 
Increasing returns for internal R&D 
User 
innovation 
Individuals contribute 
important innovations 
May (or may not) interfere with user 
ability to create innovation 
Cumulative 
innovation 
Innovation comes from 
cooperation between firms in 
an industry 
Reduces spillovers between firms; 
slows advance of science 
Open 
innovation 
Firms gain advantage through 
markets for innovation 
Increases incentives for developing 
IP; creates markets for IP 
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